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There is a well-documented positive correlation between good health, 
measured  in  a  number of different  ways,  and high  levels of  formal 
education (see, for example, Grossman 1976). Furthermore, it is gener- 
ally agreed that three potential structural relations could generate this 
this positive correlation. In the first case, poor early life cycle health may 
hamper an individual’s education, leading to the subsequent observation 
that individuals in poor health tend to have lower levels of education. A 
second relationship  may  be that schooling affects  subsequent  health 
outcomes. For example, individuals with higher levels of  schooling may 
be able to work at less hazardous jobs, or may be able to make health 
investments moie efficiently. This could happen in addition to any in- 
come effects which might be indirectly due to schooling (see Grossman 
1972). Finally, the correlation could be generated not by any structural 
relationship directly linking schooling and health, but by common under- 
lying variables (observed and unobserved) determining each. 
This paper is an empirical investigation of  the first relationship men- 
tioned above. We use panel data for a sample of  10,430 individuals who 
were high school seniors in the spring of 1972, and who were resurveyed 
in October of  each year through 1976. Various health information was 
collected in the base year of  the survey, and we use these base year 
reports as measures of health which are predetermined with respect to 
educational behavior in the subsequent five years.  We examine indi- 
viduals’ choices of  post-secondary  activities  (which include three dif- 
ferent types of post-secondary education and no post-secondary educa- 
tion), and the rate at which individuals leave educational activities, in an 
effort to determine if the behavior of  disabled individuals differs from 
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healthy  individuals, and if  these differences could be  attributable to 
health problems. We find no firm evidence that the disabled differ signifi- 
cantly in either their choices or their rate of  attrition; however, there is 
weak evidence that the disabled choose certain types of  post-secondary 
education more frequently, and stay in such programs longer. An impor- 
tant caveat should be appended: we find that the disabled score signif- 
icantly lower on standardized tests, which are also good predictors of 
educational choices and outcomes. It may be that the effects of a physical 
disability are already embodied in an individual’s skills and abilities by 
the post-secondary stage, and that subsequent effects may actually be 
minimal, or may not be observed because of  a prior selection process. 
Finally, we find weak evidence for higher rates of return to education for 
the disabled. 
As in many previous studies, the issue of  defining and measuring 
disability is troublesome. One constraint is the data, which contain no 
detailed descriptions of health, but do  contain several qualitative ratings. 
For this study, we concentrate on the high school’s evaluation of whether 
or not a student is disabled: individuals with mental or emotional prob- 
lems were excluded from the sample, and slightly over 1%  of the remain- 
ing sample were classified as disabled students. The criteria whereby such 
classifications were made are not known. Nevertheless, there are two 
advantages to using such an indicator. First, school-reported disabilities 
are likely to reflect health problems of a more permanent and identifiable 
nature than, say, self-rated health status. Second, school-reported dis- 
abilities would likely be used by the school to apply for federal or state aid 
for disabled students; in other words, this indicator is likely to have been 
used to identify a target population for a particular policy, and one might 
argue that a similar type of indicator would be used to identify problems 
and target populations for future policy. The disadvantages are that such 
an indicator may reflect “true health” no better than would self-rated 
health (or any other measure), and that even school-reported disabilities 
may be subject to some selection bias on the basis of underlying socioeco- 
nomic variables. 
Education as Sequential Choice 
In human capital models with perfect foresight, or those in which 
certainty equivalence can be invoked, a direct solution for the optimal 
amount of  a certain type of  education can be computed by equating the 
present costs incurred with appropriately discounted future gains. Costs 
are typically  divided into  direct  and indirect  costs, with  the former 
representing explicit educational expenditures and the latter accounting 
for the foregone income (or at least the valuation of  time) during the 187  Physical Disabilities and Post-secondary Educational Choice 
educational period. The effects of  a physical disability on these costs are 
not unambiguous. Direct costs will likely be higher per unit of education, 
relative to those for healthy individuals, and in the absence of  special 
assistance, must account for requirements for special equipment or ex- 
traordinary provisions.  Indirect costs may be higher or lower: lower 
opportunity costs for the disabled (because of restricted market opportu- 
nities)  would encourage higher  levels of  education, but  this may be 
partially or wholly offset by the greater calendar time required to com- 
plete a given level of education. Similarly, the benefits of higher levels of 
education for disabled persons, compared to those persons without dis- 
abilities,  are also ambiguous.  One must  remember that  benefits are 
individual-specific, and are measured by  the individual-specific bench- 
mark of earnings had a particular educational choice not been made. If 
higher education is a substitute for other, more physical aspects of human 
capital, such as good health, then the rate of  return to higher education 
could be higher for the disabled.  Conversely, if  higher education is 
complementary to good health, the rate of  return would be lower. In 
short ,  while conventional theoretical models are convenient vehicles for 
illustrating the dimensions of the problem, they provide little guidance as 
to what one  might expect to  find in data, so that the question of the effects 
of  a physical disability on educational choices is largely empirical. 
A useful extension to these models for analyzing educational decisions 
is to  postulate that post-secondary education is regarded by individuals as 
a  problem  in sequential choice,  whereby individuals may  choose to 
participate in one of several types of education, or not to participate at 
all. Such choices may be reevaluated periodically, with the result that 
education may be commenced after a period of  absence, terminated, or 
continued in some different program. Relative to the initial period, these 
decisions may be either anticipated or unanticipated, since it is reason- 
able to assume that decisions will be made conditional on new informa- 
tion (e.g. successes  or  failures in different alternatives). In terms of utility 
maximization, a particular alternative Ai  will be chosen in a given period 
if the expected stream of lifetime utility, appropriately discounted, given 
that Ai  is chosen, is greater than the expected stream of utility given that 
any other alternative is chosen.’ 
Consider  the  following  two-period  model  with  alternatives  Ai, 
i = 1,2, . . . ,  m.  Let utility in period j  under state Ai  be denoted 
V-=  11  V-(A-  11  ‘I’ X.  I’ e-)  I1  ,  j=  1,2  , 
where Xi  is a vector  of  predetermined variables (which may include 
previously chosen alternatives and their results, and where eii is a random 
component specific to individuals and unrelated to Xi.  This representa- 
tion for utility may be viewed as an indirect utility function embodying 188  Robert A. Shakotko and Michael Grossman 
the costs and benefits associated with different alternatives. Then, ex- 
pected lifetime utility, evaluated in the first period and given that Ai is 
chosen in the first period, is given by 
EU(Ail)  = Vil  + rEmax (Vk2/Ail) 
(1)  k 
where r is a discount factor, and where the second term on the right side is 
the expected maximal second period utility, given that Ai  was chosen in 
the first period, that a number of  alternatives are available in the second 
period, and that second period utility is random (because of the ek2). It 
follows that Ail will be chosen if  and only if  EU(Ail)  is maximal with 
respect to the set of first period alternatives. Formulated in this fashion, 
this choice problem is an example of  a discrete time-discrete state dy- 
namic programming problem, which can easily be extended to more than 
two periods. 
Since utility is random (because of the individual-state factors ei,),  the 
choice of  Ai for any particular  individual is a random event, and the 
probability that Ai will be chosen is given by 
P(Ai)  = P[EU(Ai)  >  EU(A,),  j  #i]  , 
where the time index is discarded for notational simplicity.  The difficulty, 
however, is that (1) is difficult to parameterize except for a few special 
cases. In the first instance, the distribution of the random variable EU(.) 
is difficult to derive. Even under the assumptions that the  V.. (.) are 
linear and the ei, are normal, this normality will not be preserved in the 
random  variable  max  (Vk2/Ai,).  In  the second instance, even if  the 
marginal distributions for each of the EU(  .) can be derived, the probabil- 
ity given by (2) is the probability of  a maximal event, and its evaluation 
requires the derivation of  the joint distribution for the set of  random 
variables EU(Ak),  k = 1,2, . . . ,m.  These random variables will not in 
general be independent,  even if  the eij are independently distributed 
across states, because valuations of  future period utility under different 
current states are likely to be correlated. 
This illustrative model is intended not so much to show the difficulty of 
parameterizing the choice problem as to indicate a possible relationship 
between the choice probabilities and the subsequent hazard rates, due to 
a self-selection bias. The hazard rate (i.e., the probability of leaving an 
activity) is determined by  the individual’s valuation of  second period 
utility in this simple model, and the hazard function would express the 
relationship of  V to the event of  leaving the initial state. Leaving, of 
course,  may  be  anticipated  or  unanticipated,  depending  on  both 
observed  variables  and  random  effects. The problem  is  that  only  a 
subsample is observed to ever have entered a particular initial state, and 189  Physical Disabilities and Post-secondary Educational Choice 
that this subsample is self-selected on a basis that may prejudice estima- 
tion of  the hazard function. 
Self-selection is only a problem if  the random component of  utility is 
not independent between periods; otherwise, we  might think of  each 
period’s choices as constituting independent events, after conditioning on 
the observed variables determining these choices. However, if  utility is 
serially correlated in its random component, the independence of  inter- 
temporal  choices vanishes.  For  example,  an  individual may  value  a 
particular alternative highly because of  certain predetermined variables 
X,  or because of a particular configuration of the eil,  i = 1,2, . . . ,m.  It 
follows that the expectation of these random variables will not in general 
be zero, given that Ajl,  for instance, is chosen: the expectation of  ejl is 
likely to be positive, while the expectations of  ekl,k  #j, are likely to be 
negative. For the subset of individuals who have chosen Aj,  if  the ei. are 
serially correlated, then E(eiz/Ajl)  fO.  Moreover, it is not hard to see 
that this conditional expectation may be related to the set of  predeter- 
mined variables X,  so that failure to take account of this nonzero expecta- 
tion may bias estimation of  the hazard function.* 
Given the difficulty even in this simple two-period case of parameteriz- 
ing the distributions associated with the events Aj,  j  = 1,2, . . . ,m,  it 
would seem to be nearly impossible to derive an exact representation for 
the above conditional expectation. However, a linear (wide sense) con- 
ditional expectation in the sense of Doob (1953) is not difficult to write, 
and has the advantage of being empirically tractable in cases when exact 
representations are not known. 
Let  z  be a  set of  sufficient statistics for the choice of  first period 
alternatives Ajl,j  = 1,2, . . . ,m;  then, for the definition of  Bayesian 
sufficiency, 
(3) 
Assuming that the underlying distribution generating the events Akl  is 
regular in the sense of  D~nkin,~  then by Dynkin’s lemma the log likeli- 
hood  function  is  a  sufficient  statistic  for  the  event  Aklr  for  each 
ob~ervation.~  Letting L denote the log likelihood function for a particular 
individual, the linear conditional expectation can be written 
(3‘) 
where a and b are in this case unknown parameters. While (3’)  may not be 
a completely accurate representation of  the “true” conditional expecta- 
tion (3), it is computationally convenient, especially in cases of  nondi- 
chotomous or nonnormal selection rules.  Furthermore,  since L  is a 
sufficient statistic for the prior selecting event, a Taylor series expansion 
of (3) is equivalent to a polynomial function in L,  and (3’)  can be viewed 
as the special case where only the first two terms are included. 
E(ej2/z)  = E(ej2/Ak,)  for all j,  k. 
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Data 
The data used for this study is a subset of the National Longitudinal 
Study of  the High School Class of  1972. In this panel survey, approx- 
imately 21,000 high school seniors were surveyed in the spring in 1972  just 
prior to graduation, and resurveyed in October of  each year through 
1976. The criteria for inclusion in the sample analyzed here are that the 
individual be a nonminority student and that relevant information from 
all panel waves exist.  In  addition, students with reported mental or 
emotional handicaps are excluded. The final sample size is 10,430. 
Several health questions were asked in the base year survey, although a 
professional evaluation of the student’s health was not part of the survey. 
Limited health information (as it related to post-secondary activities) was 
also collected in the follow-up surveys, but  since this study aims at 
estimating the effect of  poor health on post-secondary activities, we 
ensure that our measures of  health are predetermined with respect to 
these activities by using base year measures only. For the reasons men- 
tioned earlier, primary emphasis is on a school-reported disability indica- 
tor, which also includes limited information on the nature of the disabil- 
ity. Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables for the 
sample as a whole, and for those subsets of the sample which are school- 
reported disabled and self-reported disabled. 
Self-reported disabled is defined as the student’s positive response to 
the question of  whether poor health interferes with hidher education. 
Not surprisingly, a significantly higher proportion of  students report a 
disability than are officially disabled according to school records. This 
may  be  indicative  of  transitory  health  problems,  or perhaps  a  self- 
reporting bias induced by other school-related difficulties and not actual 
health problems. What is more surprising is that the two categories are 
only mildly correlated: only 34% of those who are school-reported dis- 
abled classify themselves as disabled. This may be a reflection on the 
validity and accuracy of self-reported health data. 
Aside from their post-secondary activities, the major differences be- 
tween the full sample and the disabled subsamples are found in test 
scores, both in SAT  scores for those who took the test and in the reading 
and mathematics tests administered by the survey. There are no large 
differences in either parental education or family income between the 
disabled and healthy. This is a somewhat surprising finding which runs 
counter to previous e~idence.~  Other major differences between  the 
disabled and healthy are evident in post-secondary activities. Rather than 
index each activity by time as well as type, we choose to define activity 
streams according to first experience with post-secondary education, and 
then record the duration of  particular streams. Specifically, we define 
four post-secondary  alternatives: (1) university education, (2) junior 191  Physical Disabilities and Post-secondary Educational Choice 
college education; (3)  vocational  or technical education; and  (4)  no 
post-secondary education. Since timing aspects of education are ignored, 
an individual is defined to have chosen a particular educational stream 
(i.e., one of the first three above) if  the first experience with education is 
Table 6.1  Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of  Variables 
School-Reported  Self-Reported 
Full Sample  Disabled  Disabled 
n = 10430  n = 120  n = 461  V  a  r  i  a  b  I e 
Female dummy 
SAT-Verbal score (for those with 
valid SAT scores) 
SAT-Quantitative score (for 
those with valid SAT scores) 
No valid SAT dummy 
Reading score 
Math score 
Parent’s income (1972; 100’s) 
Rural dummy (1972) 
Large city dummy (1972) 
Fathersome  p-s’ education 
dummy 
Mothersome p-s education 
dummy 
School-reported disability dummy 
Self-reported disability dummy 
First p-s education at 4-year 
college or university dummy 
First p-s education at junior 
college dummy 
First p-s education at 
vocationalltechnical  school 
dummy 
No p-s education dummy 
Years out before starting p-s 
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of  that  type. The fourth  alternative  is a residual  category,  and also 
presumed to be an absorbing state. 
It is  apparent from Table 6.1 that  the educational choices of  the 
disabled are different from those of  the full sample. In particular, uni- 
versity choices are made less often, and other educational and noneduca- 
tional choices more often. Whether this is due to disability, or to other 
variables such as the lower test scores, is the central question that we 
consider in the first part of  our empirical analysis. 
Since the focus of our study is on school-reported disabilities, and since 
the number of individuals in this category is relatively small, the power of 
any tests attempting to distinguish differential behavior of  the disabled 
and the healthy will be low. Consequently, inferences must be made at 
lower levels of  statistical significance, or else empirical results can be 
taken to be suggestive only. For example, with regard to low testing 
power, despite the indication from Table 6.1 that post-secondary educa- 
tional choices of  the school-reported disabled are different, the null 
hypothesis that the disabled and the healthy have the same choice prob- 
abilities can be rejected only at the 70% level, based on a x2  test with 
three degrees of  freedom. 
The second part of the empirical analysis focuses on the time spent in 
each defined educational state. Time is accounted by counting one year 
for each year of  full time study, and one-half year for each year of part 
time  study.  As  mentioned  above,  educational  states are  defined  as 
streams, so that cases where subsequent education is of  a different type 
than first post-secondary education are in a sense misclassified. Investiga- 
tion of  these data has shown that instances of  such education switching 
occur  relatively infrequently, except  for individuals who  move  from 
junior colleges to universities. For example, between the first and second 
year after high school, about 6% of first year enrollments switch type in 
the second year, and one-third of  these switch from junior college to 
university. The proportion between the second and third years is 10% (of 
second year enrollments), and two-thirds of these make the junior college 
to university switch. In subsequent years, about 2% switch type. While 
the analysis of  duration  assumes constancy of  educational type,  this 
imperfect assumption seems unlikely to seriously affect any main results. 
It is nevertheless important to remember especially that the junior col- 
lege alternative in this analysis is for some individuals a combined junior 
college and university education. 
The third part of  the empirical analysis examines 1976 earnings for 
those engaged in full time work in October of  that year. Clearly, this 
presents a potentially serious selectivity bias, since it includes only 60% 
of the original sample, the remainder being either in school, in part time 
employment, or unemployed. This selectivity could be particularly se- 193  Physical Disabilities and Post-secondary Educational Choice 
rious with regard to the disabled, who are likely to be underrepresented 
in this subsample, so that findings regarding the effects of  a disability 
should be viewed with this possibility in mind. 
The measure of work experience was computed in the same fashion as 
the duration of education measure, with full time work counting for one 
year, and part time work for one-half year.  Other variables, such as 
marriage and marriage plans,  are strongly related  to post-secondary 
activities, but have been excluded from this analysis since it is likely that 
they are part of  a more complicated structural model. 
Estimates 
Choice Functions 
The model outlined earlier does not point to any specific statistical 
methodology for the analysis of the educational choice problem, either in 
terms of  parametric families of  distributions or required properties of 
choice rules. The random utility formulation of  the problem, however, 
has been used in conjunction with a polytomous logit representation of 
choice probabilities, and we follow this general methodology here. Two 
different  logistic models  are investigated,  corresponding  to different 
assumptions regarding independence of  irrelevant alternatives; we find 
the implications of  each to be substantially the same, with the model 
whose null hypothesis is extreme independence being marginally supe- 
rior in terms of  a comparison of the likelihood functions at their respec- 
tive maxima.  , 
We assume that, given rn alternatives, the probability of choosing the 
ith alternative, conditional on a variable (or vector of  variables) X, is 
given by 
P(AJ  = exp(XPi)/ 2 exp(Xpk) 
k=l  (4) 
where the Pk are conformable to X, and where the Pk satisfy the identify- 
ing restriction 
Incorporating this restriction into (4), the parameter space for the uncon- 
strained problem can be denoted by P = (  P1,  Pz, - Prn -  l). Then, for the  jth 
observation, define c(k,j)  = 1  if  alternative k is chosen, and c(k,j)  = 0. 
otherwise. The log likelihood function for thejth observation then can be 
written 
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where the probabilities P are given by (4). If  follows immediately that 
given a random sample, the sample log likelihood function is 
where N is the sample size.6 
We can use the general method of  Jennrich (1969) to transform this 
maximum likelihood problem into one of nonlinear least squares. Since 
the probabilities given by (4)  are by construction in the open unit interval, 
and since (5) contains one and only one nonzero term, Lj is negative 
definite. Furthermore, from (4),  it is easy to verify that Lj  is a monotonic 
function of  each of  the elements of  P. Define 
and let y = 0. Since Lj is monotonic in P, so is fi. Now define 
uj=Y-fi(X,P) ; 
N 
it is immediately apparent that minimizing  Z ur is equivalent to max- 
imizing the sample likelihood function. 
Table 6.2 shows the results of  this method when applied to two dif- 
ferent logistic  formulations of  the choice problem. In the first, reported as 
columns (a), individuals are presumed tq choose among the four defined 
alternatives when all are in the choice set simultaneously (the extreme 
model). Most of  the effects of  socioeconomic variables appear as ex- 
pected, particularly in the equations defining the probability of university 
enrollment and no post-secondary education. Higher quantitative ability 
measures, family income, parents with some post-secondary education, 
and urban residence are all significant positive contributors to choosing 
university enrollment, and to a lesser extent, junior college enrollment. 
The coefficients indicate that disability has no effect on educational 
choices which is significant at conventional levels, once other variables 
are controlled for. At much lower levels of  significance, there is some 
evidence that a disability encourages junior college enrollment and dis- 
courages the alternative of  no post-secondary education. There may be 
two interpretations of  this finding. One is purely statistical, in that the 
standard errors associated with the disability coefficients are inflated 
because disability is a relatively rare event in the sample, and the in- 
formation passed in the “disabled” observations is swamped by that from 
the “healthy” observations, so that the power of statistical tests on these 
coefficients is low. 
The second and more straightforward interpretation is that the post- 
secondary choices of  the physically disabled are not systematically dif- 
ferent from those of healthy individuals. An intensive examination of the 
i= 195  Physical Disabilities and Post-secondary Educational Choice 
disabled subsample alone seemed to indicate that this lack of systematic 
effect may stem not from the absence of differences in the behavior of the 
disabled and healthy, but from the increased difficulty in predicting the 
choices of the disabled: the logit model applied to the disabled subsample 
alone was not significantly different than a pure random choice model 
with no predisposing variables. This lack of systematic behavior was also 
present even when different types of  disabilities, including vision prob- 
lems, speech  and  hearing  problems,  and  crippling disabilities, were 
added to the set of  predicting variables. 
Columns (b) in Table 6.2 report the parameter estimates of  a model 
which  partially  relaxes the  extreme assumption of  the original logit 
model. The modified model presumes a two-stage decision procedure on 
the part of individuals, with the probabilities at each stage described by 
the logistic distribution. The first stage decision is whether or not to 
engage in some kind of post-secondary schooling, with the second stage 
determining what type of schooling  conditional on the first stage decision. 
Accordingly, the estimates reported for the “no post-secondary educa- 
tion” alternative are dichotomous logit coefficients, and those reported 
for the three schooling alternatives are polytomous logit coefficients, 
again assuming independence among these three alternatives. 
The same qualitative picture emerges for all variables, and again there 
is weak evidence that some schooling alternative is preferred by  the 
disabled, particularly junior college. The two models, of  course, do not 
constitute a nested hypothesis, so that one cannot be tested as a restric- 
tion on the other. In any case, their predictive power is nearly the same 
(with the same number of degrees of freedom), with the log likelihood of 
the extreme model being -  10893.2 and that of the modified model being 
-  10910.5 at their respective maxima. 
Hazard Functions 
Most economic work has treated education (post-secondary or other- 
wise) as a homogeneous good, and has focused instead on duration of 
educational activities. In this section, we estimate the effect of a physical 
disability on duration for each of  the three defined educational alterna- 
tives. Since the data contain censored observations (approximately 35% 
of the individuals ever enrolled in post-secondary education were study- 
ing in October, 1976-those  not studying in 1976 were presumed to have 
completed  their  education) , methodologies  for  analyzing completed 
spells, such as those suggested by  Heckman and Borjas (1980) are in- 
appropriate, and we are forced to draw inferences regarding duration 
from an analysis of the hazard rate and its dependence on disability and 
other variables. 
The hazard probabilities suffer from the same difficulties of parameter- 
ization as the initial choice probabilities, for the reason that they are both Table 6.2  Post-High  School Choices* 
Variable 
University  Junior College  Vocational-Technical  No P-S Schooling 




No SAT dummy 
Reading score 
Math score 
-  ,057 
(.086) 
.0014 





[.  1811 
,023 




















-  .143 
(.  102) 
[ -  ,0241 
.0010 
[ -  .OOO19] 
-  ,0016 
(.001) 
(.001) 
[ -  .00034] 
-  1.309 
(.587) 
.006 






-  .122 
(.076) 
-  ,0013 
(.001) 
-  .0014 
(.001) 
-  1.069 
(.437) 
-  ,001 
(.005) 








-  .oO01 




-  ,009 
[  ,0201 
[ -  ,0021 
-  ,017 









-  ,016 
(-1 






-  .0011 
[ -  .00037] 
-  ,0004 




-  ,020 
[ -  ,0071 




[ -  ,0121 
,036 
(.026) 
-  .0009 
(.0005) 
-  ,0008 
(.0005) 
-  .036 
(.183) 
-  ,012 
(.W2) 
-  ,022 Parent's income (loo's) 
School-reported 
disability dummy 
Rural dummy (1972) 
Large city 
dummy (1972) 
Father-ome  p-s 
education dummy 
Mother-ome  p-s 
education dummy 
.0020 
[  .00068] 












-  .081 










(.  146) 
.174 
(  ,075) 
.181 
(.075) 
.0014  .oO07 
(.001)  (.001) 
[.000221 
.229  ,185 
(.417)  (.309) 
[  .046] 
(  .402)  (.262) 
.451  ,041 
(. 196)  (.131) 
[  .076] 
,185  ,091 
(.111)  (.083) 
[ .029] 
(.113)  (.085) 
-  ,202  -  ,167 
[ -  .037] 
.057  -  ,032 
[.0071 
-  ,0014 
(.001) 
[ -  .00022] 






[ -  .001] 
-  .167 
[ -  .027] 
-  .187 
(.127) 
[ -  .030] 
-  .047 
(. 130) 
[ -  .009] 
-  .0020 
(-1 




-  ,511 
(-1 
-  .265 
(-1 
-  ,149 
-  .0020 
[ -  .00068] 
(-1 
-  ,124 
(-1 




-  1.261 
(-1 
[ -  ,4011 
-  .278 
(-1 
[ -  ,0941 
-  ,283 
[ -  .093] 
(-1 
-  ,0012 
(.oO02) 




-  .805 
(.031) 
-  .186 
(.030) 
-  .192 
(.031) 
~  ~~  ~~~  ~ 
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determined  by  the same sequential  choice model.  Complicating the 
hazard problem yet further is the notion that education is “lumpy” or has 
defined units of  achievement which may affect the final distribution of 
educational duration times. The implication is that the hazard rate may 
not be smooth in the usual sense. For example, in a four-year college 
program, the hazard rate may be low after three years, and extremely 
high after four. All of this suggests that it would be hardly defensible to 
impose any particular parametric scheme either on the hazard rate, or on 
the completed durations, should they be observed. 
We adopt instead Cox’s (1972) proportional hazards model which is 
distribution-free, but which still preserves the parametric notion that 
different variables may shift some transformation  of  the duration (or 
survival) distribution in a parallel fashion. It should be noted again that 
for purposes of  this model activities are defined by  first type of  post- 
secondary education, and that exits are defined only by  leaving post- 
secondary education, and not by switching  types. Finally, we account for 
the self-selection problem including as an explanatory variable in the 
hazards model the estimated log likelihood function of  the choice prob- 
lem for each observation. The extreme model was used, so that the log 
likelihood function reduces to simply the log of the probability of making 
the observed choice of alternative. In addition to the log of the probabil- 
ity, the same set of predetermined variables as used in the choice problem 
were included as explanatory variables. The results are reported in Table 
6.3. 
The largest effects on the hazard rate are generated by  the female 
dummy variable (women had a higher hazard rate than men), by  the 
location dummies (residents of large cities had a lower rate), and by the 
parental educational variables, especially for the mother (a lower rate for 
those whose mothers had some post-secondary education). Test scores 
have some influence in the expected direction, as does family income for 
those attending a four-year college or university. 
As in the choice problem, the disability effects are ambiguous, and in 
no case significant at conventional levels. It is interesting to note, how- 
ever, that junior colleges, which were marginally more attractive to those 
with a disability, also have lower hazard rates for the disabled, signif- 
icantly different from zero at the 60% level. These two findings, albeit 
weak, might be indicative of locational convenience or program flexibility 
in junior colleges, thereby making this alternative relatively more attrac- 
tive for longer periods of  time.  The lower hazard rate also suggests 
continuation into a four-year college, but the relatively small sample of 
disabled choosing this alternative prohibits comparison of switching rates 
into four-year colleges. 
The estimated  probabilities,  included  to control for  possible self- 
selection bias, are significant in the university and vocational-technical 
hazard functions, but in the latter with a positive sign. This implies higher 199  Physical Disabilities and Post-secondary Educational Choice 
hazard rates for those more likely to choose that alternative. This result 
may not be unusual if the vocational-technical alternative is predicted to 
be an educational choice for the unsuccessful, so that high probabilities of 
choice might be associated with poor prospects for performance. The 
issue may be one, then, of  misspecification of the initial choice probabili- 
ties. 
Table 6.3  Proportional Hazards  Model (Years P-S  Schooling) 
Variable 
Vocational- 
Junior  Technical 
University  College  School 




No SAT dummy 
Reading score 
Math score 
Parent’s income (100’s) 
School-reported disability 
dummy 
Rural dummy (1972) 





Ln. of  probability of  making the 
observed choice 
Censored observations 
X2  (13 d.f.) 





-  .0014 
,0006 
-  ,294 
(. 198) 
-  .002 
(.004) 
(.ow 
-  .010 











-  .054 
-  .098 















(.  196) 





-  .048 
-  .006 
-  ,021 
-  .a03 
-  .226 
-  ,076 
-  .117 
-  .175 












-  .005 





-  .061 
(.247) 
,175 







-  .332 
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Earnings 
The ultimate question underlying much of this analysis of educational 
choices is that of final outcomes, in terms of employment and earnings. A 
typical empirical finding is that the disabled as adults earn significantly 
less than the healthy, because of both lower wage rates and fewer hours 
worked. The evidence for this finding in this case is not so clear cut, as 
shown by the estimates of a weekly earnings function for those engaged in 
full time work in October 1976. These estimates are presented in Table 
6.4. There is weak evidence for lower earnings, but also evidence that 
these lower earnings can be partially offset by higher rates of return to 
education for the disabled. Rates of return average about 3.5% for those 
who are not disabled, and the point estimates indicate an average in- 
cremental rate of  return of  about 8% for the disabled. This increment, 
however, was only marginally significant for the university subsample. 
Moreover,  this finding may be an artifact  of  the selectivity problem 
mentioned earlier. 
To  partially correct for such a selectivity problem, the log of the choice 
probability was included as a regressor in the earnings function, following 
the similar specification corrections of Heckman (1979) and Rosen and 
Willis (1979). The estimates, also reported  in Table 6.4, indicate no 
substantial difference between the two specifications, and the correction 
term appears with a small and insignificant coefficient. It should be noted, 
however,  that this lack of  effect may be due not  to the absence of 
selectivity bias, but rather to the source of  such bias, which may arise 
from the $azard functions and not the initial choices. Since the hazard 
functions are not explicitly parameterized, a correction for this source of 
bias is not possible. 
In addition to the earnings data, preliminary evidence suggests that the 
disabled have significantly higher unemployment rates. The implication 
from all of  this is that questions of disability and education cannot be fully 
answered in isolation from early labor force experiences. 
Conclusion 
While at times it is hard to define common wisdom, our findings in 
response to the descriptive questions addressed here do not always agree 
with what one might think is common wisdom. In particular, at conven- 
tional levels of statistical significance,  we find no systematic differences in 
the educational choices and progression between the physically disabled 
and the healthy, once other variables are accounted for. The disabled do 
not enroll in universities less frequently, nor do they enroll in vocational 
or technical programs more frequently. At lower levels of  significance, 
we find some preference for education beginning at the junior college 
level, with longer stays in such programs. We also find weak evidence for 
lower earnings for the disabled, but also higher rates of  return to post- 201  Physical Disabilities and Post-secondary Educational Choice 
Table 6.4  Earnings Function’ 
n = 6219 
Variable 
Equation 1  Equation 2 
Regression  Regression 








University education and 
disability interaction 
Junior college education 





education and disability 
interaction 
Experience 
Experience and dihbility 
interaction 
Ln. of  probability of 
educational choice 
R2 
-  .274 
-  .0011 
,0039 
-  ,445 
,029 











-  26.31 














-  .273 
-  .0011 
,0039 
-  ,447 
.029 









-  .001 
.1348 
-26.30 
-  1.57 
5.36 
-  1.77 
1.37 









-  1.20 
“Dependent variable is In (weekly earnings) 
secondary education. Of  course, our analysis is only partial. We have 
ignored virtually all timing aspects of  the educational process, and we 
have examined  educational choices without regard to finer aspects of 
educational  quality or  to  explicit costs and benefits of different programs. 
Notes 
Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Spencer Foundation to the 
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1. This multi-period  choice problem collapses to a single-period problem in the presence 
of  perfect foresight. 
2.  The relationship of the conditional expectation to the predetermined variables Xcan 
be briefly argued as follows: suppose  A, is chosen in spite of an unfavorable value for X. It 
follows that Ai  must have been chosen on the basis of a very favorable random component, 
which will be reflected in the conditional expectation. For a more detailed presentation of 
the selection  problem in similar contexts, see Heckman (1979) and Rosen and Willis (1979). 
3.  See Zacks (1976), pp. 61-93,  for a discussion of sufficiency as it relates to conditional 
distributions. 
4.  Which it will be, provided the distributions of the underlying ei,  are continuous and 
differentiable. 
5.  See Edwards and Grossman (1979) and Shakotko (1980). 
6.  See Dhrymes (1979) for a more complete discussion of  the polytomous logit model, 
and its relation to models of  random utility. 
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